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Abstract. In this paper we investigate how online counter-discourse is designed, deployed and
orchestrated by activists to challenge dominant narratives around socio-political issues. We focus on
activism related to the UK broadcast media’s negative portrayal of welfare beneﬁt claimants; portrayals
characterised as “poverty porn” by critics. Using critical discourse analysis, we explore two activist
campaigns countering the TV programme Beneﬁts Street. Through content analysis of social media,
associated traditional media texts, and interviews with activists, our analysis highlights the way activists
leverage the speciﬁc technological affordances of different social media and other online platforms in
order to manage and conﬁgure counter-discourse activities. We reveal how activists use different
platforms to carefully control and contest discursive spaces, and the ways in which they utilise both
online and ofﬂine activities in combination with new and broadcast media to build an audience for their
work. We discuss the challenges associated with measuring the success of counter-discourse, and how
activists rely on combinations of social media analytics and anecdotal feedback in order to ascertain that
their campaigns are successful.We also discuss the often hidden power-relationships in such campaigns,
especially where there is ambiguity regarding the grassroots legitimacy of activism, and where effort is
placed into controlling and owning the propagation of counter-discourse.We conclude by highlighting a
number of areas for further work around the blurred distinctions between corporate advocacy,
digilantism and grassroots activism.
Keywords: Social media activism, Counter-discourse, Grassroots activism, Critical discourse analysis;
socio-political issues
1. Introduction
The unsympathetic television depiction of welfare claimants living in low-income
communities has frequently been dubbed poverty porn: a label that acknowledges the
prurient and voyeuristic nature of such programming as well as the objectiﬁcation of
its subjects. In the UK, the popularity of programmes such as Beneﬁts Street, Beneﬁts
Britain, Skint, and The Scheme has led to signiﬁcant interest from researchers seeking
to understand the public fascination with the genre as well as its role in reﬂecting
current attitudes towards welfare, welfare claimants, and societal and socio-political
issues more generally (e.g. MacDonald et al. 2014). One line of such research has
conducted investigations into the content of social media discussions of poverty
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porn, e.g. both Brooker et al. (2015) and Doughty et al. (2014) highlight the high
levels of mistrust, antipathy and even hysteria directed at the communities portrayed
within the programmes. Notably, Brooker et al. (2015) describe the Twitter conver-
sation around #beneﬁtsstreet as being primarily “knee-jerk” reactions to the
content and characters of the programme, with the majority of tweets being
offensive and abusive towards them. More generally, boyd (2012) has drawn
attention to the (as yet poorly understood) role that online digital media can
have in propagating online cultures of such mistrust, suggesting that ‘hysteria
isn't necessarily from on high, but, rather, all around us.’ In other words, no
longer is hysteria delivered exclusively in a top down manner, for instance
from broadcast media. It is now also propagated and reinforced at a grass-
roots level and is insidiously present in the social media streams that people
encounter and absorb across the Internet and, in particular, on social media
platforms such as Twitter and Facebook.
The effects of the everyday propagation of problematic portrayals of whole
communities on social media are poorly understood, though in the worst case it is
not unreasonable to assume that it could lead to a lack of tolerance, respect and
inclusion, as well as fear, mistrust and their marginalisation. Set against a backdrop of
austerity and deep government spending cuts, such effects could have severe ofﬂine
implications for local and even for national social cohesion (Forrest and Kearns
2001; Parkinson et al. 2006). For instance, the spread of derogatory remarks on social
media directed towards people claiming welfare beneﬁts in the aftermath of the
broadcasting of the ﬁrst series of Beneﬁts Street led to the UK Government Minister
responsible for welfare claiming public validation of his swingeing austerity-driven
reforms (Chorley and Chapman 2014).
Though it seems clear that online discussions of poverty porn alongside television
broadcasts often propagate inﬂammatory and problematically provocative content,
there is also scope to use social media in a more constructive manner in this setting.
For instance, groups of activists could utilise the affordances of social media to
provide a more balanced or counter viewpoint on speciﬁc issues. Indeed, one
emergent focus of the literature on poverty porn has been the role that it might play
as a catalyst for political activism; Hester (2014), for instance, speaks of ‘weapon-
izing’ the prurience of poverty porn to challenge prevailing attitudes. In other
settings, social media has become an important political tool and is widely used by
political parties, organisations and, indeed, activists to publicise, organise and
mobilise their supporters (Gerbaudo 2012). Events such as the Arab Spring uprisings
(Khondker 2011; Howard et al. 2011), the #Occupy movement (Juris 2012; DeLuca
et al. 2012) and the Spanish (Anduiza et al. 2014), Greek (Theocharis et al. 2015) and
Portuguese (Accornero and Pinto 2015) anti-austerity protests have motivated pol-
itics and communications researchers to reﬂect upon and study the communicative
power of social media inmoments of activism and social action. The HCI and CSCW
community has also begun to build an understanding of many of the design issues
stemming from digital activism and collective movements (e.g. Crivellaro et al.
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2014; Asad and Le Dantec 2015; Foth et al. 2013; Wulf et al. 2013; Massung et al.
2013).
In this paper we extend this work by analysing the processes through which
activists deliberately design, deploy and orchestrate online counter-discourse cam-
paigns around socio-political issues. In particular, we explore how social media
platforms are used in conjunction with more established forms of activism to
generate a counter-discourse against the stigmatisation of communities portrayed
through so-called poverty porn television. We focus on two examples of such
activism that attempt to foster online counter-discourse against the dominant narra-
tive of two series (or seasons) of the programme Beneﬁts Street. Our work is
motivated by a current lack of deep understanding of how digital activists design,
deploy and subsequently orchestrate campaigns that challenge the dominant narra-
tive of broadcast media. In studying these counter-discourse campaigns, we
reﬂect on the effectiveness of the approaches used by activists and identify
the ways in which existing social media platforms support activism work.
Since we were speciﬁcally interested in understanding the counter discourse
aspects of these activist campaigns we conducted critical discourse analysis
(CDA) to understand the motivations of the activists and the online reaction
to their activism. Using data from multiple social media platforms and
through interviews with the activists concerned, we present an analysis of
two case studies of responses to the Beneﬁts Street programme: (i) the
Parasite Street website and the subsequent discussion it promoted on Twitter,
and (ii) a multi-platform social media campaign called Positively Stockton.
Our ﬁndings highlight how activists tailor their understanding of success of
their own counter-discourse campaigns to that of their target audience, that
they speciﬁcally leverage the technological affordances of different social
media platforms to control and contest discourse, and that access to networks
of power and privileged spaces help amplify campaign messages. We also
reveal issues surrounding the boundaries between activism, corporate advo-
cacy and digilantism, and the considered usage of the affordances of social
media by activists.
In the following section we ﬁrst provide further background to digital activism
and counter-discourse activism, as well as contextualising Beneﬁts Street within the
UK’s contemporary politics and broadcast media. Following this, we present our
methodology and the ﬁndings from our critical discourse analysis. Finally, we
discuss the key issues raised by the analysis, highlighting their implications for
HCI, CSCW and social computing research.
2. Background
In this section we discuss research related to digital activism, as well as the history
and speciﬁcs of counter-discourse activism. We then present a summary of the
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background to the programme Beneﬁts Street and describe relevant elements of the
digital activism that have been mobilised against it.
2.1. Digital activism and social media
Events such as the Arab Spring in 2010–11 and protests related to the 2008 ﬁnancial
crisis have been the driver for many activist groups, social movements and political
campaigns, often played out over social media. Many of these are grass-roots
initiatives, often instigated by dedicated activists as well as the citizenry.
Traditional media, e.g. BBC (2012), has provided widespread coverage of
these movements, as well as documenting their use of social media. Much
work has been done to understand, typify and describe the way that activists
are using technology and social media to propagate their messages, mobilise
supporters and organise events. Studying social media usage during Spanish,
Greek and US protest events related to anti-austerity and the Occupy move-
ments, Theocharis et al. (2015) found that Twitter conversations at the height
of these protests were predominantly used for disseminating information
about the movement, rather than calls for action and organisation as
previously thought. Poell and Borra (2012) studied activists at the G20
meeting in Toronto who tried to use Twitter, Flickr and YouTube as alter-
native channels for journalistic-type reporting as events unfolded in the city.
They found that the majority of reports were from a small number of
“insiders” and that contributions from “the crowd” were relatively small.
This work reveals somewhat the difﬁculty activists have in mobilizing and
motivating people from the wider population into political action.
DeLuca et al. (2012) explored how theOccupyWall Street protest movement used
Twitter, Facebook and YouTube as a means of bypassing traditional media and
propagating their messages. Juris (2012) provides an ethnography of the way
members of the Occupy movement used social media to engage and mobilise large
numbers of people in discussions and protests. Furthermore, the nuanced under-
standing of digital technology by activists as a means for organising and discussing
movements and messages is demonstrated by Anduiza et al. (2014), who surveyed
demonstrators involved in the Spanish 15 M anti-austerity demonstrations. They
found that small organisations, such as neighbourhood and town action groups and
single-issue movements, coalesced around and utilised the digital media platforms of
the Real Democracy Now group, a large “umbrella” group, as a means of furthering
their inﬂuence. In having privileged access to the Real Democracy Now platform,
they linked people and small organisations together into a larger collective, which in
turn enabled the large scale, multi-issue 15 M demonstrations in 2012. This evi-
denced an understanding of the ways social media works and its limitations (i.e.
many small Facebook groups will not gain much traction) by the activists, and
knowledge that collaborating and shared access to platforms allowed them to
achieve the same goals.
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Tonkin et al. (2012) analysed tweets relating to the London 2011 riots around two
decentralised social movements, one aiming to riot and cause criminal damage and
the other to counter the damage caused by the riots. Both of these movements were
organic in their creation, stemming from news coverage of the riots. While the
majority of rioters used closed communication platform such as Blackberry Mes-
senger, the counter-movement openly used Twitter with hashtags such as
#BroomArmy and #OperationCupOfTea. In their analysis of 62,000 tweets sent
during the riots, Tonkin et al. (2012) found that Twitter was primarily dominated
by users countering the riots, and that those users would actively use the retweet
functionality in order to “name and shame” other Twitter users who were suggesting
rioting and criminal action. Similarly, Lotan et al. (2011) modelled the ﬂow
of information between key players during the 2011 Egyptian and Tunisian
Revolutions. By classifying types of Twitter users, they were able to identify
those who would amplify messages, or spread them across geographical
areas. This, importantly, also revealed deliberate exploitation of networks
of privilege, which bloggers and activists would target in attempts to gain
traction and attention.
2.2. Slacktivism
Somewhat in contrast to this work, the relative ease with which political and civic
functionality has been implemented into digital platforms has led to the emergence of
the concept of “slacktivism”. Initially intended as a positive expression of bottom-up,
youth-led activism, the term has now adopted a more negative connotation, referring
to activities that require little effort yet give the participant a sense of (self)satisfaction
and political engagement. Morozov (2012, p.190), for instance, notes that the
technological ease with which campaigns can be created using platforms such as
Facebook has led to activist campaigns that reduce complex societal issues to issues
solvable purely by social media, as they are based on ‘the assumption that, given
enough tweets, all the world’s problems are solvable’. However, Christensen (2011)
refutes the use of the “slacktivism” term, contending that it is used pejoratively to
‘belittle activities that do not express full-blown political commitment’. Christensen
(2011) instead investigates the efﬁcacy of online campaigns and services that have
been branded “slacktivistic” in nature, and demonstrates that although it is difﬁcult to
identify positive off-line effects, existing literature suggests that digital political
participation has a weak positive link with ofﬂine political involvement, and that
there is no clear negative link with ofﬂine political involvement. While noting the
need for further work, Christensen (2011) concludes that slacktivism is a harmless
form of digital political participation that might at worst lead to increased awareness
about political issues.
Conﬂicting views of the efﬁcacy and value of “slacktivist” activities remain
evident, however. Lee and Hsieh (2013) note that donations to speciﬁc concerns rise
after participation with online petitions, whereas Schumann and Klein (2015) found
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interaction with slacktivist-type activities reduced the willingness to participate in
physical, off-line actions. Importantly, Schumann and Klein (2015), p.318) also
emphasise there is a complex underlying ‘relationship between low-threshold online
and ofﬂine collective actions.’
2.3. Counter-discourse activism
The concept of counter discourse has its roots in the work of Foucault (1970) (as
outlined in detail by Moussa and Scapp 1996) who argued that when those who are
normally spoken for and spoken about begin to speak for themselves, they create a
counter discourse, which is an act of resistance to power oppressing them. Such acts
of political resistance can manifest themselves in many different forms. Sanford
(2001) explores the varied counter discourse created by Maya women in Guatemala
in response to cultural oppression and state-sponsored genocide. For example,
activists and community members used newspaper adverts to spread information
about those murdered in massacres, and countered anti-Communist and anti-Mayan
histories of violence.
Recently, it has been observed how social media and online platforms have
supported new spaces for, and forms of, counter discourse. In the wake of the
2015 Charlie Hebdo shooting, Giglietto and Lee (2015) explored the creation of a
counter hashtag, #JeNeSuisPasCharlie, in response to the #JeSuisCharlie Twitter
hashtag. The predominant discourse of #JeSuisCharlie stated that freedom of speech
was under threat by religious intolerance. Giglietto and Lee (2015) observed how the
#JeNeSuisPasCharlie hashtag established a counter discourse, rejecting the original
framing with one that both denounced the attacks but distanced support for the work
of Charlie Hebdo. This counter discourse allowed Twitter users to express their own
political identity without fear of disrupting social norms. In a further example,
through their analysis of the #sealﬁe campaign, Rodgers and Scobie (2015) show
how Inuit communities were able to contest a discourse established by a well-funded
NGO. Countering the widely celebrated “#selﬁe” produced by Ellen DeGeneres at
the 2014 Oscars, members of the Inuit community replied with their own hashtag,
#sealﬁe. This was in response to DeGeneres’s support of anti-seal hunting cam-
paigns, and allowed the Inuit to reject the discourse of “cruelty” and “exploitation”
around seal hunting. Over the period of a few weeks, the hashtag received wide-
spread coverage on traditional media, along with outpourings of support from other
indigenous communities, thus demonstrating how grassroots counter-discourse
movements can stimulate broader political conversations.
Clearly, there are many examples of activism using digital tools; moreover, the
nature of their utilisation for campaign propagation and organisation is only just
beginning to be understood. Furthermore the acknowledgement and exploration of
slacktivist-type interaction through social media is a hotly-debated area. While these
examples of counter-discourse activism highlight the role social media can play in
the construction of such campaigns, this remains a relatively understudied subject.
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What is lacking in the literature is an understanding of how such counter discourses
are designed, deployed and then orchestrated by activists to be spread and discussed
among social networks. In order to address some of these issues, we present an
exploration of the ways in which two digital activists engaged in generating a
nuanced counter discourse in a deliberate manner across multiple social media
platforms.
2.4. Beneﬁts street and the language of poverty porn
The Channel 4 series Beneﬁts Street is one of the most well-known examples of
poverty porn television in the UK. Initially broadcast in 2014 in the UK, the pro-
gramme gained both popularity and notoriety due to its provocative portrayal of
welfare claimants living in the city of Birmingham. The makers of the show took
the opportunity to contrast the seemingly feckless behaviour of the show’s subjects
with the austerity and welfare reform being endured by the larger population. An
example of the provocative nature of the programme was the overlay of the Twitter
hashtag #beneﬁtsstreet on screen at controversial moments to, seemingly, motivate
viewers to engage with the live back-channel of discussion about the show. This
supported online discussion about the programme during live broadcasting, coalescing
around a single hashtag. Brooker et al. (2015) provide a comprehensive exploration of
the qualities of the “ofﬁcial” online discourse, performing an analysis of the
#beneﬁtsstreet Twitter online discussion. They noted two periods of tweeting activity,
with the majority of tweeting occurring during broadcast of the programme (approx-
imately 30,000 tweets per episode), and far smaller amount of tweeting when the
programme was off-air. During broadcasts, tweets were predominantly ‘knee jerk’
reactions grounded in the content of the programme, with a general theme of offensive,
abusive and judgemental language and statements, focusing on the appearance of those
in the programme, their living conditions or their attitudes. For example:
“White d looks like she hasn't brushed her teeth since 19” [ibid, p6]
“She got no money for food and stuff but sits there with an iPhone 5s?” [ibid, p6]
However, Brooker et al. (2015) also noted that during the online discussion,
predominantly when the programme was not being broadcast, there was an amount
of conversation that attempted to provide alternative viewpoints to the dominant
narrative of the programme. This frequently took the form of the sharing of external
links to substantiate and refute claims made in the online discussion or in the
programme, as well as individuals and groups sympathising with the programme’s
characters, or disagreeing with the themes of the show. For example:
“C4 are using naive and vulnerable people to get higher ratings, exploiting their
lack of education, media misrepresentation” [ibid, p7]
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The website Parasite Streetwas explicitly identiﬁed by Brooker et al. in the online
discussion during the broadcast of the programme as a commonly occurring link,
with the tweet content looking to contest the overall themes of Beneﬁts Street.
Based on this work, it can be seen that the qualities of the online discussion during
the programme’s initial broadcast echoed the views presented by the mainstream
right-leaning press: i.e. that welfare was a major, perhaps unnecessary and often
unfair, burden to taxpayers and the UK economy. This framing, or narrative, of the
programme, and the signiﬁcant coverage in online and traditional media, was
reinforced by commentary from politicians during the six weeks that the show was
on air, with the programme and issues it raised receiving discussion in the UK
Parliament (2014) as justiﬁcation for welfare reform.
The rhetoric of poverty porn and welfare reform are deeply rooted in the media
and political debate. Mooney (2011) describes the predominant rhetoric, termed as
“Broken Britain”, as being rooted in a perceived breakdown in family unity. Attrib-
uted to teenage pregnancies and a reduced societal emphasis on marriage, this
rhetoric contends that much of the population now depends on the welfare state,
and is the cause of other social issues. Runswick-Cole and Goodley (2015) notes
how public discourse has become:
“saturated with rhyming soundbite dualisms (shirker/worker; striver/skiver) and
pejorative stereotypes of teenage mothers, feckless fathers, troubled families and
fraudulent claimants”. [Cole 2015, p2]
Indeed, Slater (2014) examined how politicised “Think Tanks” published research
articles which further perpetuated the concept of “Broken Britain”, which in turn
circumvented engagement with the societal and state causes of poverty, directing
gaze instead on the supposed dysfunction of family units. Slater posits that this is a
politically motivated choice, and encourages support for austerity measures:
“the pages of policy reports and into public discussion […] welfare reform
enthusiasts need a populist language in which to articulate this story of state and
personal welfare failure. It is through the explosion of 'poverty porn' television that
welfare discourses of political elites have become translated into authoritarian
vocabularies.” [Jensen 2014, p2].
The company that produced Beneﬁts Street, Love Productions, have produced a
series of documentary programmes focused on austerity and poverty that have been
both critically acclaimed by the media and the public and critiqued by segments of
the press. In response to the accusation they are producing poverty porn, they defend
their programme making decisions as exposing relevant issues in British society (as
described by Plunkett (2014). However, Jensen (2014) counters this defence as “a
pre-emptive sleight of hand”, asserting that “such programming is 'porn' in the sense
that it aims to arouse and stimulate the viewer, to provoke an emotional sensation
through a repetitive and affective encounter with the television screen” [Jensen 2014,
p3]. At the time of writing, there have been two series of Beneﬁts Street: series one
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aired in January 2014 focussing on the residents living in James Turner Street in a
Birmingham suburb; series two aired in April 2015 and was focussed on Kingston
Road in Stockton-on-Tees in the North East of England.
2.5. Online counter discourse to beneﬁts street
As outlined above, counter discourses are often established by those who feel their
voice or position is not being represented by dominant discourse. Throughout the
broadcast of Beneﬁts Street there have been a number of counter discourses that have
emerged from different individuals and groups challenging aspects of the shows
dominant discourse. For the purposes of this paper we focus on two of these as case
studies: Parasite Street and Positively Stockton-on-Tees.
2.5.1. Parasite street
Parasite Street (2014) is a website created in January 2014 as a response to the ﬁrst
series of Beneﬁts Street. The website was developed and launched by Stephen Reid
(SR), a self-titled “digital activist”, as part of the hacktivist collective
“Undergr0und”. The website asserted that subsidies to the rich cost ﬁfty-four times
more than welfare fraud, and presented this through a short narrative backed up with
visual graphs and other information. The website consists of only a single page
which tells the narrative as the user scrolls down (Figure 1a). The page features a map
of “Parasite Street”, modelled on a wealthy area of London, populated with interac-
tive buttons. Each of these buttons produces a pop-up that outlines problems related
to the UK economy following the 2008 world recession. For example, one of the
“problems” referred to is tax avoidance: the process of legally reducing a corpora-
tion’s tax liability which is often discussed in the UKmedia and central government.
Another button highlighted the issue of buy-to-let landlords: the process whereby
landlords purchase houses speciﬁcally to rent out, which in some areas of the UK
causes inﬂation of housing prices and pricing ‘normal’ buyers out of the market.
Another refers to the problem of too-big-to-fail banking, noting how some ﬁnancial
institutions have a great deal of state involvement, which would cause great eco-
nomic problems if they were to fail. Underneath the section outlining these problems,
the website featured a simple graph showing the comparative cost of subsidies to the
rich versus welfare fraud (Figure 1b). At the bottom of the webpage there was
embedded the typical sharing functionality for Twitter and Facebook users. There
was also a set of 5 pre-fabricated tweets that a Twitter user could click on to send
(Figure 1c).
Alongside the website, the campaign utilised Twitter as its primary social media
platform. The Twitter accounts held by SR and Undergr0und were used to promote
the website on its initial launch. Two Twitter storms were organised using the
“crowdspeaking” platform Thunderclap.it, which allows activists to coordinate
large-scale tweeting efforts among their supporters to “increase [a project’s] social
reach” (Wardle 2014). Each Thunderclap contained a pre-made tweet mentioning
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Parasite Street and the “ofﬁcial” Beneﬁts Street hashtag #beneﬁtsstreet, and were
timed to coincide with live broadcasting of an episode of Beneﬁts Street. Twitter
users could sign up via the Parasite Street website to have their account participate in
this Twitter storm.
2.5.2. Positively stockton-on-tees
The Positively Stockton-on-Tees (PSOT) campaign was launched in November
2014 in response to the commencement of ﬁlming for the second series of Beneﬁts
Street. The campaign was supported by Stockton-on-Tees Borough Council (the
local government authority) with Mike McGrother (MM), a local activist and
Creative Partner for the council, as a key organiser. Given the expectation, based
on the ﬁrst series, that Stockton would be portrayed negatively in the programme, the
PSOT campaign was aimed at promoting positive stories about the town. The
campaign also intended to “poke fun” at Love Productions, the producers of
the show. The campaign ran from November 2014 and concluded in January
2016.
Unlike Parasite Street, PSOTwas conducted both online and ofﬂine. The website
(www.positivelystocktonontees.co.uk) was used as an archiving and blogging plat-
form to record the events of the campaign. The website was structured into a short
“About” page outlining the motivations behind the campaign, along with a page for
each event associated with it. Each of these pages provided a 100-word summary of
the event, along with images and videos. PSOT held accounts on Twitter, Facebook,
Instagram and YouTube; however Twitter and Facebook were the primary platforms
for communication. These accounts were used to share existing community events
from Stockton, content from residents, and promote PSOT’s own events.
Between the start of the campaign and the ﬁrst episode of Beneﬁts Street 2, PSOT
organised three major events. In February 2015, Love From Stockton involved MM
visiting the Love Productions ofﬁce in London to deliver Valentine’s gifts and
perform a song. In February 2015 the Great British Take-Off (a satire of Love
Production’s most popular programme in the UK, The Great British Bake Off) was
released; this was a video directly questioning the methods of Love Productions and
the portrayal of Stockton in the upcoming second series. Finally, The Loudest
Figure 1. From left to right: a Landing page of Parasite Street website; b Visualisation of cost
used on website; and c Prefabricated tweets and sharing functionality. © Stephen Reid 2014
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Whisper in March 2015 was a large community game of Chinese whispers involving
around 5000 people. A troupe of clowns was hired by the PSOT campaign to carry
the message between participants and to purposefully manipulate the message to
remain the same throughout the event.
3. Aims & methodology
In order to understand counter-discourse activism in relation to Beneﬁts Street, we
used these two prominent activist campaigns as case studies. Our aim was to
understand the ways the activists identiﬁed problematic elements of a perceived
dominant discourse, and attempted to counter-act these through a range of online and
ofﬂine activities. As such, our research was oriented towards studying the ways the
activists positioned their work in relation to Beneﬁts Street and the nature of the
discourse that underpinned their work.
To capture the varied approaches taken across Parasite Street and PSOT, we
gathered a comprehensive dataset; for each of the case studies we collected data
and discussion from social media and interviewed the individuals that orchestrated
the campaigns. For the purposes of presenting our analyses, all social media com-
ments that are not attributed to either of the campaigns as ofﬁcial accounts or a key
person are anonymised and presented with pseudonyms (e.g. P1123) in accordance
with British Psychological Society (2013) ethics guidelines.
3.1. Data collected for parasite street campaign
The content of www.parasite-street.co.uk was collected (1 page), along with tweets
from Twitter containing #parasitestreet from 15th January 2014 until 31st August
2015. This comprised of 360 tweets in total. This included tweets by@Undergr0und,
and the Twitter account of SR, the creator of the site. There were in total 2068 tweets
associated with the Thunderclap campaigns, but as these duplicated the original
message, only the original message was included in the data set. A semi-structured
interview was conducted with SR. The resultant audio was transcribed and included
in the data set. A commentary piece written by SR for The Independent newspaper
was also collected, along with webpages for the two Thunderclap.it campaigns.
3.2. Data collected for positively stockton-on-tees campaign
For PSOT we collected: all 21 videos from the ofﬁcial YouTube account; all 950
tweets from the Twitter feed for@PositivelySOT, the ofﬁcial Twitter account; all 149
posts from the ofﬁcial Facebook page for “Positively Stockton-on-Tees”; and all 87
posts and related comments from the PSOT Instagram feed. The data ranges from
December 2014 until August 2015. A semi-structured interview was conducted with
MM, a main organiser of PSOT campaign. The resultant audio was transcribed and
included in the data set.
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3.3. Critical discourse analysis
We conducted critical discourse analysis (CDA) to examine our datasets and draw
out discourses and common themes. Our work was guided by Fairclough (2003),
who deﬁnes CDA as the analysis of linguistics, power, and the continuity and
structuring of discourse. The method is heavily rooted in the work of Foucault
(1970) and maintains the view that power is discursive and does not exist in isolation
from other communication and the world around it. As such, CDA is able to
“perform the linking of social and political engagement with a sociologically in-
formed construction of society” (Wodak andMeyer 2009, p.7). When analysing how
discourses are challenged and countered, as well as understanding their impact on
society, CDA allows us to understand the subtleties of language and speciﬁc acts of
power performed through each campaign, as well as elucidating the technological
features which enable or disable these actions. Therefore, CDA allows for a more
nuanced understanding of the relationship between activists, technology and power
structures.
During our analysis, we were speciﬁcally interested in the form of the counter
discourses established by each case study, as well as the positionality and framing of
these in relation to Beneﬁts Street. We were also interested in the ways power was
enacted through the various digital and physical platforms. Despite the textual focus
of CDA, this methodology does not discredit non-textual content, and indeed in
recent years there has been a growing appreciation of multimodal approaches to
CDA that study how text, talk, images, ﬁlm and other forms of media combine to
enact and re-enact discourses (see Manchin and Mayr, 2012). More recently, dis-
course analysis has been used to study discourses on social media, including how
power is legitimised and delegitimised within Iraqi political communities on
Facebook (Al-Tahmazi 2015) and how politically charged YouTube videos and
comments interact to promote alternate discourses around the same media (Way
2015). Building on this work, our use of CDAwas in an analysis of various textual
and non-textual content (interview transcripts, Twitter comments, Facebook posts,
Instagram images and YouTube videos and comments) as a way of examining the
work of the activist across these different platforms and how discourses were
designed and deployed by them and engaged with by audiences.
In order to identify these features, we approached the data from a chronological
perspective. The data analysis was performed by two researchers, and involved
closely reading through the textual data and viewing associated video and visual
data related to each case study. When reading through the data we were particularly
interested in identifying key events that related to each of the activist endeavours
(e.g. public events, signiﬁcant postings, the broadcast of the television programme)
as well as notable changes in the discourse over time. Through familiarising our-
selves with the data in this way, we identiﬁed frequently occurring terms, words,
expressions or visual tropes. From here the textual and non-textual datawas coded by
the two researchers. Codes were created in an open-edned manner, with a focus on
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generating both descriptive and interpretative summaries of the data. Having coded
the data, we compared the codes to one-another and clustered these around related
and contrasting thematic frames. At this stage, we developed short memos to further
summarise clusters of codes—these memos speciﬁcally focused on why and how
speciﬁc language and linguistic features were used and the types of ideological and
political goals they may have served. As such, our intention here was to
“denaturalise” (Machin and Mayr, 2012) language and highlight ways in which
events, people and entities are represented to meet particular ends. Following this,
common themes were identiﬁed both within and across the data sets, from which we
constructed a narrative based on excerpts of data related to each case study. We
describe the ﬁndings from our analysis through these themes in the following
sections.
4. Analysis of parasite street campaign
In the following subsections we discuss our analysis of the Parasite Street campaign
according to three prominent themes established during analysis: Positionality to
Beneﬁts Street, Conﬁguration and Control through Online Platforms, and Propaga-
tion of Message and Engagement.
4.1. Positionality to beneﬁts street
The Parasite Street campaign was explicitly framed as a counter discourse to Beneﬁts
Street. The Parasite Street website predominantly contains indirect references to the
show. For example the leading line on the website reads: “Imagine a different street;
not in the deprived suburbs of a Midlands city, but at the super-rich heart of the
Capital. Welcome to…” [Website, Parasite Street]. The invitation to the reader to
imagine a different street assumes that they are already thinking of a street, and it is
likely that they will have been guided to the website via online discussion around
Beneﬁts Street. Furthermore, it makes a direct reference to the show through
articulating “not the deprived suburbs of a Midlands city”. This text is used consis-
tently throughout the campaign. On social media, the framing of the activism as
being in opposition to the dominant discourse of the show comes through direct and
explicit use of the endorsed Twitter hashtag #beneﬁtsstreet, for example:
“#beneﬁtsstreet is nothing, the real shit happens on #parasitestreet” [P12, 15.01.14,
Twitter], and “You have heard of #beneﬁtsstreet, check out #parasitestreet. A good
response!” [P17, 15.01.14, Twitter].
The website and associated text are also positioned to align with and acknowledge
the issues being addressed in Beneﬁts Street. This is done using tweets that place
Parasite Street in comparison toBeneﬁts Street. Consider the tweet: “Parasite Street –
much worse than #BeneﬁtsStreet <website URL>” [@Undergr0und, 16.01.14,
Twitter]. Here, the use of the words “much worse” invokes a comparison between
the target and the source of the tweet, situating one in a more negative sentiment than
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the other. This implicitly acknowledges that the issue of welfare fraud is something to
be negatively looked upon, but poses that the issues represented in Parasite Street as
worse. In this way, the website acknowledges failings in the UK’s state welfare
system – the issue Beneﬁts Street sets out to illuminate – but contrasts this fraud with
issues it deems as more problematic. This positioning is consistent with the motiva-
tions behind the campaign:
“It didn’t takemuch to switch the frame: there are scroungers in society but they’re
not at the bottom, the real scroungers are at the top. Take the story but tell it in a
different way” [Interview, SR]
The alignment between these two stories is facilitated by the existence of the
Parasite Street argument in media already:
“Owen Jones [a British journalist who writes for the Guardian newspaper] had
touched on similar ideas about tax-exploiters and buy-to-let landlords, and being
involved with UK Uncut I was very familiar with the tax-avoidance side of
things” [Interview, SR]
This framing was signiﬁcant because it enabled Parasite Street to resonate with
groups and individuals whose views aligned with those in this segment of the British
press. This is evident in the data, with other groups creating infographics similar to
Figure 1b in support of the Parasite Street argument. The ﬁrst example of this, seen in
Figure 2, was produced by a digital newspaper “The London Economic”, which
tweeted their own infographic along with the following text “@Undergr0und
@<anonymousCelebrityUser> Which costs the most? #beneﬁtsstreet
#parasitestreet” [@LondonEconomic, 16.01.14, Twitter]. The use of the @ symbol
combined with a username, is an affordance of Twitter which will send a notiﬁcation
to those users, containing the tweet. This is known as a “mention” and is a powerful
way to direct messages to any Twitter user. The infographic, very similar to the style
presented on the Parasite Street website (Figure 1b), presents a similar framing of the
issue to Parasite Street. Despite using both hashtags, the #parasitestreet wording is
located with “£850BN ofﬁcial cost of the bank bailout”. This refers to the 2008 UK
bank rescue package (a government action to stabilise UK banks), instead of the
various “abuses of the super-rich” mentioned on the Parasite Street website. The
London Economic describes themselves as a “digital newspaper with open and
accessible views on business, economics, ﬁnance and politics” (The London
Economic 2016) and as such it might be expected that their presentation of the
Parasite Street issue is skewed towards ﬁnance and the economy.
A key stage in the campaign’s Twitter activity was when the usage of Parasite
Street becomes dissociated from references to the Beneﬁts Street show and hashtag.
Two days after the release of Parasite Street, the ﬁrst occurrence of the #parasitestreet
hashtag without reference to Beneﬁts Street occurs: “@David_Cameron You are a
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parasite we need to feed #ParasiteStreet” [P1282, 17.01.14, Twitter]. This tweet is an
example of frame bridging (Snow and Benford 1988); the process of linking two
separate, but congruent, discourses together. The tweet takes the literal connotation
of the term parasite – a relationship where one gains at the expense of another – and
applies it to the (then) UK Prime Minister. This was echoed in other tweets: “MPs
waste lots of public money commissioning portraits! <url> #parasitestreet” [P1015,
17.01.14, Twitter] and “This MP, voted against this parliament bill, and now receives
$100ks from oil companies” [P1095, 20.01.14, Twitter]. In these examples, two
discourses are drawn together; the discourse established by Parasite Street that the
rich are exploiting and taking money from the state, and the discourse established by
the UK Parliamentary Expenses scandal of 2009, where some members of parlia-
ment (MPs) were exposed for claiming excessive – or even illegitimate – expenses.
SR commented on why he stopped publicising the Parasite Street campaign after
the broadcasting of Beneﬁts Street:
“During the last episode… it seemed a natural point to put it to one side. Detached
from the Beneﬁts Street TV show, it doesn’t mean anything straight away. It’s only
relevant in a certain context.” [Interview, SR]
This statement creates an interesting contrast. At ﬁrst, it is at odds with the ways in
which tweets become used to bridge between separate discourses and take on new
meaning. But it also sits in opposition to the continued usage of Parasite Street until
1st June 2015, 17months after the creation of the Parasite Street website and hashtag.
After mid-February 2014 the hashtag sees low frequency use (5–7 messages per
week), with the majority being examples of frame bridging as described above.
4.2. Conﬁguration and control through online platforms
The Parasite Street website used carefully considered design decisions in order to
frame and direct online discussion. The website was hosted on a private server,
Figure 2. The London Economic’s infographic based on Parasite Street discourse. © The
London Economic 2014
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which allowed the creators a great deal of control over the content; but this also
allowed them to avoid potential confrontation with a web hosting provider who may
disagree with, or be asked by a television production company or broadcaster to remove
the website due to the contentious nature of its content. There are no tools available for
comment or discussion on the site itself, thus the website performs a one-way, author-
itative communication with the readers, while allowing the message to remain clear and
unchallenged [Website, Parasite Street]. There is no “ofﬁcial” hashtag for Parasite Street
itself, the only mention of a hashtag throughout the website is to #beneﬁtsstreet in the
prefabricated tweets. As such, when reading the website it appears there is nowhere to
direct comment or critique of the Parasite Street message to, apart from #beneﬁtsstreet.
However, immediately upon the publication of the website, Twitter users created
#parasitestreet. For example, a user who is editor for a newspaper tweeted: “You’ll like
#parasitestreet if you’re watching #beneﬁtsstreet parasite-street.co.uk” [P4, 15.01.14].
Another user: “Some people on #beneﬁtsstreet are stuck in low paid jobs, the business-
men live on #parasitestreet” [P1005, 15.01.14, Twitter] and another tweeting “Let’s get
#parasitestreet trending people, if you like #beneﬁtsstreet” [P1007, 15.01.14, Twitter].
The use of embedded social media sharing tools within the website itself allowed
SR to monitor how people were engaging with the campaign, as well as channel their
conversations to popular digital spaces that fed back information about the number of
shares. He used these as a measure of success:
“I could see that at a certain point [the number of shares] started growing very
quickly… if people are seeing it in their feeds, people are commenting and it’s
entering the public mind in some way.” [Interview, SR]
Furthermore, the sharing functionality embedded into the website also displayed
to visitors the number of times the Parasite Street page had been shared on those
platforms (Figure 1c), which allows readers an insight into the frequency, temporality
and digital space in which it was being shared. This gives a direct indication to the
reader about how “hot” the topic of the website is. It can be assumed that a large
number of shares indicates a lot of conversation going on around Parasite Street, and
this might encourage readers to interact with the sharing functionality if they can
easily see lots of people are talking about the website already.
The online discussion was carefully orchestrated using the sharing functionality
provided. SR explained how drawing the reader’s attention to the opportunities to
share the website with others was a critically important aspect of designing and
producing the website:
“It’s very important to pay close attention to the share images… you’ve got half a
second to grab people’s attention.” [Interview, SR].
SR also considered how Twitter and Facebook would display information about
Parasite Street when it was shared by a user, and knew how to conﬁgure this
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speciﬁcally to maintain a consistent message. The pre-conﬁgured share information
for Twitter and Facebook duplicated the ﬁrst line of the website - “Imagine a different
street; not in the deprived suburbs of…” [Parasite Street sharing text, Facebook.com]
- as well as including a thumbnail image of the website. As noted in the previous
section, by carefully structuring this shared information and using it across all
platforms a consistent message was created. This was something which SR acknowl-
edged as part of creating a “frame” for discussion:
“The intention was not to create a movement, but to create a frame… and as an
opportunity for others to take that framing and talk in those terms.” [Interview,
SR]
This framing is further evidenced in the language choices of the pre-fabricated tweets
provided at the bottom of the website: “Let’s get our priorities straight – subsidies to the
rich cost us 54x as much as beneﬁt fraud <website-url> #beneﬁtsstreet” [Pre-fab tweets,
Parasite Street website], see Figure 1c for further examples. Here, the term “Let’s get our
priorities straight” initially conveys a sense of action through “let’s get”, while “us” and
“our” engenders an inclusive element to the message that aims to reach out to the reader.
This phrase explicitly states the priorities of society are wrong, and that we need to ﬁx
them. It is hinted that this can be achieved, or at least elucidated, through reading the
Parasite Street website. By ascribing emotion and politics, the tweets appeal to not only
the reader of the Parasite Street website who is choosing which tweet to share, but to
readers of the #beneﬁtsstreet Twitter feed who will also see these tweets. The pre-
fabricated tweet mechanism could be described as slacktivistic in nature. It relies on a
simple interaction (click a button), and it is headed with the words “Share this if you
agree”. Therefore, readers are encouraged to participate in sharing the Parasite Street
discussion on social media as a way of expressing their agreement, and the content of the
tweets does not incite readers to carry out any further political participation, such as
attending a rally. This falls neatly into the deﬁnition of slacktivism as presented by
Morozov (2012). However, SR’s intention here was to create a talking point around the
issues raised in the website, without any further political aspiration. This stance is
reinforced by SR during the interviews:
“The intention was not to create a movement, but to create a frame… and as an
opportunity for others to take that framing and talk in those terms.” [Interview,
SR]
The use of Thunderclap.it - a crowdspeaking platform (see Wardle 2014) that
allows people to mass-share a tweet from their accounts at the same time - was also
carefully considered and conﬁgured. The actual tweet used for the Thunderclap was:
“Parasite Street: see how subsidies to the rich cost us 54x as much as beneﬁt fraud
#beneﬁtsstreet <Thunderclap URL>” [Thunderclap.it, 20.01.14]
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As mentioned above, SR had purposefully chosen to re-use the exact wording
from the Parasite Street website in order to maintain a consistent message. For SR,
the use of Thunderclap was somewhat an unknown, but:
“it was a good lesson, you can maximise the impact of a Thunderclap by picking
carefully the time of it… if you pick the right hashtags there’ll be lots of other
people on Twitter reading about things.” [Interview, SR]
In his discussion of Thunderclap, SR demonstrated a thorough understanding of the
way people interact with the Twitter stream, and explained how he used the Thunderclap
platform as a means to inject the counter discourse of Parasite Street directly into the
conversation of Beneﬁts Street while the show was being broadcast. The fact that Love
Productions used a Twitter hashtag for the predominant online discourse for Beneﬁts
Street allowed the Parasite Street campaign to directly inject their counter discourse into
a highly-visited and highly-visible sphere of discussion. Critically, SR identiﬁed this was
a sphere of discussion that could not be moderated by Love Productions:
“We timed to do them during the actual programme. A lot of people were
tweeting… so that people searching for comments about the programme would
then read these tweets and have a chance to think about things differently”
[Interview, SR]
This allowed each Thunderclap to effectively hijack the ofﬁcial Beneﬁts Street
discussion and saturate the Twitter stream with their own counter-discourse.
4.3. Propagation of message and engagement
Although predominantly guided to Twitter, the campaign also took advantage of
other platforms with different power dynamics:
“Mentions of it [Parasite Street] popped up on various news articles, and I think
Nick Clegg [then deputy UK Prime Minister] made mention of the framing,
implying he had seen it. [There were a] number and type of mentions in other
media channels as well.” [Interview, SR]
SR also authored a commentary piece in the Independent (a national centre-left
newspaper in the UK) that presented and deepened the argument of the campaign.
Similarly, he appeared in an interview on Russia TodayUK to discuss Parasite Street,
a channel which is known for covering topics outside themainstreamUKpress, often
critical of UK policy and government, and aligns closely with ofﬁcial Russian state
discourse. The leveraging of these platforms demonstrated an understanding
of the power available by propagating the campaigns message through
traditional mass-media.
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As well as using these more traditional routes to communicating the campaign in
mass-media, to maximise the initial propagation of the Parasite Street SR also
leveraged connections within his social network:
“There’s a network called NEON, I … emailed announcing Parasite Street and
asking to tweet it […] I would [also] have givenmy friend at UKUncut a call or an
SMS saying ‘Hey, just my latest thing do you mind putting it up.’” [Interview, SR]
Indeed, within the ﬁrst couple of days of tweets about Parasite Street those
tweeting about it include the online editor of a major UK newspaper, online
campaign groups and celebrities. For example, we have already noted how editors
of UK national newspapers were engaged on Twitter, while also a well-
known British celebrity with 12 million Twitter followers tweeted “Are we
able to handle the reality? Welfare claimants are just a distraction from the
real problem <Parasite Street URL>” [P2, 15.01.14]. This is a critical action
for propagation as it allows access to credible and authoritative digital
spaces, in the form of the Twitter feeds of campaign groups and newspaper
editors. SR’s access to these spaces is afforded by his personal and profes-
sional social networks. Importantly, these kinds of discursive spaces are not
necessarily accessible to grassroots activists.
The campaign was also designed to propagate messages quickly and concisely, so
as to promote wide engagement and quick understanding of the matter at hand. SR
explained how the website, its visuals and integration with social media platforms
was tailored to present information in a way their target audience would understand:
“Not everyone has the time or inclination to read 800-900 word comment
pieces… It's about taking out the key information representing it in a form that's
consistent with people's minutely short attention spans in the Internet age.”
[Interview, SR]
This is demonstrated in Figure 1b, which shows a visualisation from the website
conveying subsidies to rich and fraud by the poor. Techniques have been used to
position the issue of fraud by the poor, labelled “Beneﬁts Fraud”, as smaller and less
signiﬁcant and in line with the overall Parasite Street framing. The large circle is
labelled with four items, such as “Tax dodging by the super-rich”, whereas only one,
“Beneﬁts Fraud” is associated with the smaller circle. The font used to label the small
circle is also smaller than that used to label the larger circle, and overall the
visualisation is ambiguous because it does not mention whether the two circles are
correctly represented to scale. While on initial viewing it may appear to be a simply
constructed graphic, it is clear this carefully crafted visualisation is intended to
quickly portray the message of the campaign, that the issues presented in Beneﬁts
Street are dwarfed in comparison with the issues around tax avoidance, buy-to-let
landlords and other exploits of the rich [Website, Parasite Street]. The use of external
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sources to contextualise and reinforce the piece is described as underpinning the
Parasite Street campaign:
“I value facts and I value information. There’s a sense that the stuff right wing
political parties put out is fact-free. So by virtue of having some proper statistics it
can pique people’s interest, and give an air of legitimacy.” [Interview, SR]
Through SR’s leveraging of an extensive network of activists, journalists and
traditional media contacts, he was able to design and propagate a counter-discourse
campaign that appeals to social media users in a way that directly contests and
challenges people reading the #beneﬁtsstreet Twitter feed.
5. Analysis of positively stockton data
The second activist campaign we analysed was Positively Stockton-on-Tees (PSOT).
As with Parasite Street, we divided our analysis across three common themes:
Positionality to Beneﬁts Street, Conﬁguration and Control through Online Platforms
and Propagation of Message and Engagement. Within each, we explored two key
discourses; one contesting Beneﬁts Street, and one that ampliﬁed Stockton-on-Tees.
5.1. Positionality to beneﬁts street
Unlike Parasite Street, the PSOTcampaign positioned Love Productions, rather than
the Beneﬁts Street programme itself, as the target of the activism. Framing this
discourse against the production company was an important strategic act whereby the
target of the campaign became personalised to an identiﬁable group of individuals.
This stance was made obvious by the ﬁrst post made to the PSOT Facebook page,
expressing the intention to “gently poke fun at the ﬁlmers [sic] of Beneﬁts Street”
[PSOT Facebook Page, 17.11.14]. This position is reinforced by the activists’ initial
motivation:
“Let’s do something that’s really constructive criticism, you don’t get that in a
petition… I don’t really feel that this is a campaign against Beneﬁts Street, more to
get people questioning things.” [Interview, MM]
This framing against Love Productions drove the creation of the Lovelier Pro-
ductions “anti-brand”:
“I can’t match them for technical, or time… but I can do lovelier, I can do things
nicer than them.” [Interview, MM]
As explored by Hollenbeck (2006), anti-brands are often social movements with a
shared rejection of the corporate values embodied by a speciﬁc brand – for example,
Feltwell Tom et al.
“Anti-McDonalds” and “McSpotlight” emerged in the early 2000s as anti-brands
focused on highlighting the environmental problems caused by the multi-national
fast-food retailer McDonalds. In a similar manner, Lovelier Productions is an overt
attempt to create an anti-brand which stands opposed to Love Productions. The use
of the word lovelier, while being a humorous play on the name of Love Productions,
also produces an implicit qualiﬁcation of Love Productions, stating the ambition that
it is possible to have productions that are more loving to the places they describe and
document in their shows. Appropriating the format of their name acts to draw
comparison between the two, even though their production values and quality may
not be on the same level technically.
Crucially, the anti-branding of Lovelier Productions was a critical part of the
overarching PSOT campaign, and a key quality of the counter discourse of PSOT
was the mimicry of the production company. The ﬁrst of the PSOT events, Love
From Stockton, seesMM visit the ofﬁces of Love Productions - speciﬁcally the ofﬁce
of Kieran Smith, their then Head of Factual Entertainment:
“I’m just here to deliver ﬂowers [I said]… and he came out, I sang to him, they
watched the ﬁlm [Great British Take-Off], they said it was lovely, and thanked us
very much [for the gifts].” [Interview, MM]
The act of delivering ﬂowers and a Valentine’s card ties back to the anti-brand of
Lovelier, as Valentine’s gifts are in contemporary popular British culture often associated
with romance and love. It is also an important territorial act; by entering their private
space he is perpetuating the sense that Stockton has been entered by Love Productions
without the community’s approval. Furthermore, MM mimics their attitude:
“They asked me to come in for a meeting, but I haven’t got time for that. I’m
playing the game. They’d never shown any interest in me before…” [Interview,
MM]
The overarching message of The Loudest Whisper, the community Chinese whispers
event, was, again, mimicking the attitude of Love Productions. Rumours had spread
around Stockton that some of the footage ﬁlmed as part of the Beneﬁts Street show was
‘re-enacted’ several times - thus calling into question the legitimacy of the programme as
a documentary. The event referenced this rumoured manipulation of footage:
“The role of the clowns was to pass the message, but equally manipulate the
message. The message isn’t in the words; the message is in the portrayal of the
community.” [Interview, MM]
This was further expressed in The Great British Take-Off video, where the
campaign creates a powerful claim by appropriating and satirising the name of Love
Productions’most famous TV programme, The Great British Bake Off. In the video
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the Beneﬁts Street logo can be seen being defaced (Figure 3). This is followed with a
screen that read “It’s called Kingston Road”. In doing so, the video rejects Love
Productions’ labelling of “Beneﬁts Street”, and uses assertive and corrective lan-
guage to relabel the street with its correct name. Overall, the video is overtly
mocking, and confronts Love Productions about their representation of Stockton.
Another scene in the video questions “Will you be showing everything that went on
whilst you were here?” followed by “Or just what you chose to show”. This is then
followed by a montage of images taken from the PSOT Facebook page and website,
showing previous events, festivals, gatherings and ﬁrework displays. This is accom-
panied by the main musical theme of the Great British Bake Off. As the theme plays,
it begins to distort and have electronic drums overdubbed, playing in a remixed style.
The question “Will you manipulate?” is displayed, which is followed by clips of a
controversy that surrounds an episode of the Great British Bake Off where Love
Productions were accused of manipulative editing to make an incident in the show
more dramatic, which led to emotional distress to one of the show’s contestants (see
Deans 2014). By referencing an editing-based controversy, to which Love Produc-
tions never directly responded, they called into question their ability to provide a
balanced view of Stockton on Tees.
5.2. Conﬁguration and control through online platforms
The PSOT campaign was focused towards the residents of Stockton, which initially
drove the decision to use Facebook as the main means of communicating with the
campaign’s audience. The Facebook page of the campaign very quickly got linked to
other pages associated with local, news, information and events:
“there’s lots of little local sites [pages] like NortonNews and Stockton Incidents. It
doesn’t take long for people to say ‘It’s happening!’ and then myths begin before
realities.” [Interview, MM]
Figure 3. Screen capture from The Great British Take-Off. © Positively Stockton-on-Tees,
2014
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Using Facebook as the primary social media was also seen to ﬁt with the perceived
dominant social media activities of the residents of the town. Situating the platform
on Facebook would, as MM suggests above, allow the campaign to be involved in
the discussion about Beneﬁts Street 2, and allow them to counter myths and
misinformation. In doing so, there was a sense that the activities of the campaign
could be aligned with the daily social media activities of those who it wished to reach
and participate in their events. The desire to engage only the local population in the
campaign also manifested in the decision to advertise the campaign on a local refuse
vehicle (Figure 4). The vehicle would be visible only to residents of Stockton, and
was intended to direct them to the website and social media. By focusing the
campaign on the town of Stockton, PSOT was able to produce a digitally and
physically localised counter-discourse to Beneﬁts Street, using Facebook groups
oriented towards the local population as opposed to the wider public, and operate in
physical locations that would only be seen by local people. This geo-localisation of
the counter-discourse was in line with the organisers’ motivation to minimise the
impact on the local community of the programmemaking, by allowing them to refute
rumours and claims around the programme, as well as discuss the programme on
their own, counter-discourse terms.
The PSOTcampaign used careful orchestration across digital platforms to control
the nature of discussion. YouTube was used purely as a means of delivering videos,
with comments disabled, disallowing any interaction and discussion around the
content uploaded on the site itself. This acted to direct viewers towards their main
discussion platforms, Facebook and Twitter, thus reducing the digital spaces that
might require moderation by the campaign organisers.
As noted, Instagramwas primarily used for replicating content from the Facebook
page, where the image shared would be identical to that used on Facebook and
accompanied by a comment that would simply re-direct users back towards the
Figure 4. PSOT branded refuse vehicle. © Positively Stockton-on-Tees, 2014
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website. For example, when promoting The Loudest Whisper event with an image of
Psst… branding:
“#psst us for the ﬁrst public session of #theloudestwhisper today? Be at
#InﬁnityBridge #stocktonontees for 11.30am ready to start just after 12pm. Look
out for the guys & girls in one of these funky hoodies - they'll keep you right!
www.positivelystocktonontees.co.uk” [Instagram, @positivelystocktonontees,
15.03.15]
All posts provide a URL to the PSOTwebsite, along with related hashtags (#psst,
#theloudestwhisper). They also often used #stocktonontees to encourage residents to
participate in the physical events, as well as to focus their posts to those from, and
interested in, the town of Stockton-on-Tees.
The PSOTwebsite also contained a page titled “The Story So Far”which took the
form of a live social media feed aggregated from all of their ofﬁcial accounts. The
language choice of “the story so far” transmitted a grassroots image of the campaign,
which in part disguises its provenance as a local government supported and commis-
sioned initiative. It also created a narrative to the campaign, linking individual events
of the campaign together, which can be easily read by those not located in Stockton-
on-Tees. This feed only contains social media posts from the ofﬁcial PSOTaccounts,
so the campaign is able to maintain tight moderation and curation of the content that
appears within the “story”.
Critically, throughout their engagement with social media the PSOT campaigners
were careful to avoid directly referring to the Beneﬁts Street show. Throughout all of
its activities, the ofﬁcial Twitter account never used any hashtags associated with
Beneﬁts Street, instead the activists chose to use their own hashtags for all content,
predominantly #psst. By avoiding the wider Beneﬁts Street discourse they were able
to maintain a clear, largely PSOT dominated, online discourse that was distinct from
the Beneﬁts Street discussion. This further aligned with the organisers’ motivations
to produce a localised counter-discourse for the residents of Stockton-on-Tees. The
selection of the “#psst” and Psst… branding also gives the impression the campaign
is operating underground and quietly, as the name is playing on the common form of
quietly getting someone’s attention, e.g. “Psst… I have something to tell you”. By
association, this gives the impression the campaign has something secret to tell
readers, potentially something that others don’t want to be known. Importantly, this
positioning of the PSOTcampaign as a secret or underground initiative contrasts with
the public funding of the work, as it might be expected that there would be more
“ofﬁcial” council branding throughout the campaign.
When the second series of Beneﬁts Street was ﬁrst broadcast on the 11th
May 2015, PSOT did not acknowledge the programme at all. Instead it used Twitter
to retweet messages either mentioning the @positivelySOT account or that mention
Stockton-on-Tees in a positive manner. An example tweet read: “If you want to see a
rounded view, look at @positivelySOT #Stockton” [P52, 18.05.15, Twitter]. The
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authors of these tweets that were retweeted by the PSOTaccount either had a vested
interest in Stockton-on-Tees itself (such as referring to Stockton as their hometown
either in their account proﬁles or in the content of individual tweets) or were aware of
critique towards so called poverty porn programming (for example, stating they were
a politics researcher at a major university in their proﬁles). These retweets and
interactions served to maintain a distance from the Beneﬁts Street discourse while
simultaneously engaging with supporters and co-opting their content within the
counter-discourse.
It was notable that MM drew on a range of analytics and data to understand the
reach and impact of the campaign:
“Actual views are about 50-60,000. But impressions I know it’s well over half a
million. Everyone keeps messaging me saying it’s been shared all over the world”
[Interview, MM]
MM regularly monitored who was commenting and engaging with the PSOT
content. Doing this helped to signal important moments where he felt the campaign
was having an effect:
“Their [Love Productions’] camera man commented on the video [on Twitter
linking to The Great British Take-Off video onYouTube] and said ‘Ohhh, creepy’,
so they know The Loudest Whisper is happening. That’s job done from my point
of view.” [Interview, MM]
This informal discourse, via a comment, helped to signify to MM that people he
and the campaign considered important, inﬂuential or part of the problem (i.e. Love
Productions) were aware of his actions. This reafﬁrmed to him that their work was
having some of the intended inﬂuence on what they do, even if in a small way.
5.3. Propagation of message and engagement
The campaign established a strong discourse to amplify the qualities of Stockton-on-
Tees, and speciﬁcally the community within it. To do this, the campaign actively
solicited content from its followers:
“Hello to all our new ‘Like’rs! [sic] … Don’t forget to tell us why you love
Stockton-on-Tees… why are you positivelySOT?” [PSOT Facebook page,
28.11.14]
Here, the use of the phrase “don’t forget” encouraged new supporters to tell the
campaign about their feelings for Stockton. This was an invitation to share local
pride, while also signalling that the campaign needed the contributions of local
residents in order to function meaningfully. These contributions were further
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encouraged by a monthly competition, termed Positively Prizes, in which the
campaign sought content from the local population. The campaign announced in
December that it would be working with:
“Stockton Borough businesses over the coming year and handing out special
prizes to some of the best pictures, stories, ﬁlm and letters that we receive from
you” [PSOT Facebook page, 15.12.14].
In February the ﬁrst competition post appeared, with a meal at a local Stockton
restaurant:
“Mohujos has very kindly donated a meal for four people in support of the
Positively Stockton-on-Tees campaign… All you need to do is send us your
photos and thoughts about why you are ‘Positively Stockton-on-Tees’” [PSOT
Facebook page, 19.02.15]
The competition continued to run every month, with prizes such as meals, ice-
skating lessons, and rowing-boat experiences. By encouraging supporters to share
content with the chance to win locally-oriented prizes, this reduced the content
creation burden for the organisers; it also resulted in contributions that were specif-
ically focused on the town itself, thus creating a space for discussion around Stockton
in the past, present and future amongst supporters.
The PSOTcampaign also reposted content from elsewhere on Facebook, typically
passing only brief comment itself. On the 31st of December, PSOT shared a post,
originally from the page “Breaking News (Teesside)”. The post depicted a young girl
who had cut off her hair for charity in aid of sick children. Alongside the shared post,
PSOTcommented: “Wow, this very generous little girl from Norton is an inspiration.
Well done you lovely young lady” [PSOT Facebook, 31.12.14]. Acknowledging and
praising this act helped to portray the campaign as being involved in the community,
because it was sharing a post from a Facebook group dedicated to local news, but
also as a campaign that harbours the value of charity and giving to others, by
endorsing the girl’s actions.
There is, of course, a degree of tension in themanner in which the PSOTcampaign
positions itself however. While much of its counter discourse presents PSOT as a
grassroots campaign, as already noted it is primarily a (local) government-run
initiative. This tension is played out in the use of closed spaces for advertising
(e.g. the side of a municipal refuse collection lorry, mentioned previously) as well
as actions taken to associate themselves with ofﬁcialdom. For example on 19th
February 2015, PSOT posted a picture to Facebook of local councillors holding a
Psst… sign. This was captioned “Great to see Cabinet members from Stockton-on-
Tees Borough Council supporting the campaign!! #psst” [PSOT Facebook Page,
19.02.15]. This would suggest PSOT have been actively seeking endorsement by the
local council, and are proud of receiving support from them. Interestingly, the single
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comment on this post reads “Mike said he wasn’t!” [PSOT Facebook Page,
19.02.15]. We would interpret this as meaning “he said he wasn’t involved with
the council or supported by them”. The use of the phrase “supporting the campaign”
in the PSOT is somewhat unclear, and only adds to the ambiguity of the council
support for the campaign. The ﬁrst video shared on Twitter and Facebook “Events So
Far” is badged as created by the local governmental authority and highlights all the
events that have occurred in the last year (2014) in Stockton. The somewhat
ambiguous nature of who created the video muddies the understanding of who is
running this campaign. A post showing the municipally controlled riverside lights in
orange to support PSOT conveys the same ambiguity - the reader is not able to read
whether this is ofﬁcial support by the local government (who control the lights),
whether the campaign comes from the council itself, or whether the campaign have
taken over the lights in a non-sanctioned manner. Moreover, the campaign uses
spaces usually closed to grassroots activists, such as municipal refuse vehicles
(Fig. 4) as a space for advertisement and an opportunity for a photo shoot. These
acts are juxtaposed by some of the events conducted, such as Love From Stockton
(the visit to Love Production’s ofﬁces), that convey the spontaneous, local-politics
driven hallmarks of grassroots activism through their use of physical occupation.
These actions build authority and legitimacy for the campaign as a grassroots
movement. Indeed, MM frames himself as a local community activist, but works
for the local council to run those events.
6. Discussion
In the previous sections we have analysed how the two campaigns, Parasite Street
and PSOT, positioned themselves in relation to Beneﬁts Street, how they utilised
platforms and technology to conﬁgure this positionality, and how they propagated
messages related to their counter-discourse and sought engagement with public
audiences. In this section we expand upon and discuss our analysis to extend and
enrich the understanding of counter-discourse activism as it is relevant for the
CSCW, social computing and human-computer interaction research communities.
We structure this discussion around issues pertaining to (i) audiences and successes,
(ii) control and ownership and (iii) power and privilege.
6.1. Engaging audiences and understanding successes
Our analysis of Parasite Street and PSOT highlighted the ways in which both sets of
activists, from the outset, had imagined audiences for their work; however these
audiences were complex and, moreover, the ways in which social media and other
digital services were used to reach them were multifaceted.
In the case of Parasite Street, the creator (SR) was driven by an aspiration to
disrupt and inject alternative discussion into an existing Twitter stream around the
ﬁrst series of Beneﬁts Street. His ambition was to reach out to and promote
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discussion amongst those who were already tweeting in relation to the programme’s
broadcast; in doing so, he envisaged that those consuming and reﬂecting upon the
programme’s dominant discourse would be confronted with an alternative narrative
around state beneﬁts. However, in order to reach this wider audience, the campaign
had to make use of an initial, smaller, audience of Internet-savvy, politically-aware
social media users who were likely already aware of the problematic politically-
charged messages embedded in poverty porn television programming. These users
were accessed primarily through SR’s existing personal online social network; this
network was not only large (relatively speaking), it also included many well-known
and inﬂuential left-wing journalists, political activists and bloggers. SR had access to
this powerful and sympathetic audience and was able to speak directly to them
through a counter discourse on the Parasite Street website that had an attractive
ideological ﬁt; this in turn provided the means to build a user base that was necessary
for the crowdspeaking event. This, in turn, allowed the existing online discussion
around Beneﬁts Street to be disrupted, ultimately reaching the intended audience of
social media users who were not necessarily already reﬂecting upon the values
inherent in such television shows.
PSOT was perhaps more complex in its processes of engaging with its audi-
ence(s). In many respects, the ambitions of this campaign were similar to those of
Parasite Street in that the campaigners wished to disrupt the existing discourse
around state welfare, beneﬁts and the othering of a whole town and its community
through the promotion of an alternative narrative. As noted, however, much of the
campaign’s social media activities, as well as the PSOT website, were focused on
actively promoting positive stories and news of the local area. These stories were
then propagated to those liking or following the PSOT campaign on Facebook and
Twitter who were primarily people who identiﬁed with, or had some personal
connection to, the town of Stockton-on-Tees. Therefore, while the primary work of
Parasite Street was to rapidly and concisely convey politically-charged content as
quickly as possible to a national audience, PSOT (on the face of things) presented
itself as a slow-burning campaign that had local values and local legitimacy, carefully
posing questions and communicating with what was imagined to be a primarily local
audience, in order to build engagement and content over time. This was further
supported through the use of ofﬂine promotional material related to the campaign,
which often quite literally (as in Figure 4) spoke directly to those already living and
working in the town. However, the focus on nurturing positive sentiments about the
town served, perhaps intentionally, to deﬂect attention away from the campaigns’
ultimate - and quite subversive – objective; to discredit the creators of Beneﬁts Street.
Indeed, the three main events which were organised during the PSOT campaign
explicitly targeted the creators, thus deviating from the focus on ‘positive stories’ to
directly provoke the production company and challenge the tactics and methods used
in the creation of poverty porn television. In many respects these interventions stood
in sharp contrast to, and even contradicted, how the campaign otherwise presented
itself on a daily basis; hence while the primary audience for the campaign was
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imagined to be local people who would share stories and take part in organised
events, the ultimate ambition was to reach those seen to be creating the discourse to
be countered in the ﬁrst place.
Both sets of activists approached their respective campaigns with a deliberate
goal; to create what we characterise in Foucauldian terms as a form of counter
discourse. However, both campaigns also had differing audiences for their work; for
Parasite Street the ultimate audience were those people discussing Beneﬁts Street
during its broadcast, while for PSOT it was those who identiﬁed positively with the
town as well as, ultimately, the makers and distributers of poverty porn. The nature of
the different audiences of the two campaigns led to two drastically different ap-
proaches to engagement. The use of pre-written, standardised text which explicitly
eschewed overtly political language meant that the Parasite Street campaign pur-
posefully appealed to those interested in simple, low-threshold activity as a means of
participating in a cause – i.e., it was slacktivist in nature. While the impact
of slacktivist campaigns remains contentious (as discussed in the background
review), SR stressed that the primary aim of his campaign was to create a
frame for discussion, and to propagate this frame as a way of talking about
some of the issues being raised. In purposefully appealing to simple, low-
threshold political activity (“click this button to share a tweet”) those who
identiﬁed with the cause were able to spread the Parasite Street message
unaltered, quickly, in a sphere where SR perceived there to be a dominant
discourse around beneﬁts and welfare. In the context of MM’s work on
PSOT, however, such lightweight forms of interaction (e.g. sharing a post
written by PSOT) were interspersed with more complex engagements where
people with afﬁliations to Stockton were invited to contribute content, to
offer positive news stories and to participate in organised events in the town.
A wider question remains as to whether counter-discourse activism work can be
considered slacktivistic by nature. Both SR and MM put in a large amount of time
and resource to conduct the campaigns, along with interacting with traditional media
to ensure their counter-discourse was widely populated. The online-only nature of
Parasite Street aligns the campaignmore closely with slacktivism, with SR purposely
reducing the campaign to low-threshold political interactions he is able to success-
fully, in his eyes, propagate the simple, but powerful counter-discourse of Parasite
Street. On the other hand, PSOT features a strong online-presence, along with a
complex conﬁguration of ofﬂine relationships with the residents of Stockton-on-Tees
in order to solicit participation in events, contribution of content for the campaigns,
and interactions with town ofﬁcials and residents to coordinate events. From these
two case studies it is clear that low-threshold interactions can be a crucial component
of counter-discourse activism campaigns, but that this is also dependent on the nature
of the engagement and intervention. Therefore, it is unfair to describe them in the
negative terms that have become associated with the “slacktivism” label, as the
political engagement of organisers and participants, in some cases, can be far beyond
low-threshold political engagement.
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Regardless of the approaches taken to engage people in the counter-discourse, we
might imagine that the perceived successes of the campaigns were measured by how
far they reached their intended audiences. Our interviews with the respective activists
reveal that the effectiveness of each campaign was measured using a range of
methods by their creators, with (as might be expected) importance given to social
media metrics such as ‘shares’, ‘likes’, ‘engagements’ and video views. Conversely,
both stated they were not interested in the precise details and number of these social
media metrics, and used them more as a rough gauge to whether their discourse was
being shared. In this vein, they acknowledged that any evidence of wider groups or
signiﬁcant individuals engaging with campaign content was similarly, if not more,
important as it was an indicator of how far and wide their counter-discourse was
being propagated. In the case of PSOT, for instance, the moments where Love
Productions themselves interacted with the campaign were valued as important
signiﬁers of success, as were messages from people from outside of the Stockton
area. For Parasite Street, the mention of the website by UK politicians, the invitation
to author commentaries in mainstream media, and to be interviewed on television,
were seen as critical successes. As such, although the quantiﬁcation of success
through measures of interaction and shares was viewed as important by the activists,
a more nuanced understanding through interactions with supporters and observation
of wider networks allowed them to evaluate their success in their own, often
personal, terms.
This raises difﬁcult questions for researchers whom are interested in understand-
ing the effectiveness of activism and counter discourse on social media. In some
instances, the outcome of the activist cause itself might be measurable, as noted on a
small-scale by Crivellaro et al. (2014), and might even be related back to the
activists’ actions; however, in more complex and wide-ranging cases (such as
national issues around welfare as discussed here) this would seem to be
unachievable. Related work by Potts et al. (2014) explores the way success might
be measured, and the authors conclude that more work needs to be done around
facilitating activists to leverage speciﬁc platform affordances in order to meet their
campaign goals. Though elements of the activism discussed here have deﬁnite
parallels with the social media marketing strategies frequently adopted by commer-
cial organisations and corporations, conventional deployment of typical social media
metrics when assessing brand and impression management (Hoffman and Fodor
2010; Peters et al. 2013) seem ill-equipped to provide deep insight into the impacts of
activism.
6.2. Control and ownership
In both campaigns, the presentation and manipulation of information aggregation on
social media was important for positioning each campaign alongside the existing
discourse. Our analysis shows how both campaigns used a central, conventional
website as an authoritative space to present elements of their message in ways that
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could not be explicitly contested. However, when it came to engaging with and
orchestrating their message via social media, each campaign had different ap-
proaches to maintaining control of their message.
Parasite Street was primarily concerned with explicitly positioning its alternative
discourse alongside that which was seen to be the dominant reaction to the show. The
campaign deliberately and explicitly chose to “hijack” the hashtag #beneﬁtsstreet
which was being promoted by the TV broadcaster - a strategy that has been used
successfully by grassroots movements in the past to disrupt the marketing campaigns
of commercial entities, corporations and government agencies, e.g. through the
hijacking of the McDonalds’ Twitter promotion hashtags #McDstories (Mcfedries
2013) and #CheersToSochi (Pegoraro et al. 2014) and the #myNYPD law enforce-
ment public relations campaign (Jackson and Welles 2015). In their analysis of the
#CheersToSochi hijacking, Pegoraro et al. (2014) draw speciﬁc attention to the loss
of message control by the original corporate entity - a clear objective of the Parasite
Street campaign in this instance. Usage of the Thunderclap platform also allowed
orchestration of large-scale tweeting at strategically important times, rapidly reveal-
ing the campaign to a wide audience in a ﬁrestorm (Pfeffer et al. 2014). Due to the
deliberate use of #beneﬁtsstreet and the timing of the Thunderclap alongside the start
of the broadcast, Parasite Street was able to inject over 2000 tweets into the Twitter
stream associated with Beneﬁts Street at exactly the moment viewers would be
looking at the Twitter feed. While with this comes the ‘danger’ of entering the
unmoderated public discussion on Twitter, Parasite Street issued deliberately pack-
aged pre-fabricated tweets and share text to set the terms by which the campaign
would be discussed on social media.
The Parasite Street campaign’s practical attempts to create appealing tweets
speaks to the general research challenge of constructing messages with a high
likelihood of being retweeted or gaining momentum in a social network (e.g. as
discussed by André et al. 2012; Comarela et al. 2012; Alonso et al. 2013). Under-
standing the impact of pre-crafted messages on social media has been explored
empirically in mainstream politics; for instance, Bronstein (2013) found the levels
of persuasion displayed in US presidential election candidates’ posts equated to more
comments and likes. At the grassroots level, Juris (2012) found that appealing to
mainstream, non-activist social media users was difﬁcult due to the diffuse, non-
centralised nature of the #Occupy movement and the subsequent lack of any agreed,
actionable demands and political stances. In our analysis above, we suggest that SR’s
use of social media sharing technology allowed the campaign’s message to remain
unchanged. The simple pre-fabricated tweets were carefully crafted by SR to include
evocative and persuasive language (“You’ll LOVE Parasite Street”, “Still angry
about #beneﬁtsstreet?”, see Fig. 1c), and the affordances of the sharing mechanism
meant this message would not bemodiﬁed (easily) by those sharing it. This addresses
the issue identiﬁed by Juris (ibid) by enforcing a speciﬁc language and political
framing into the tweets of Parasite Street’s supporters. The possibility of these
messages being retweeted by other users in the Twitter network extends the reach
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of Parasite Street beyond the users interacting with the website, and maintains the
original persuasive language crafted by SR.
In the example of PSOT, the maintenance of control over discourse on social
media was enacted primarily through the use of language to communicate to their
audience and through the choice of platforms with which to engage with these
audiences. While PSOT did have an active Twitter account, this was primarily used
to direct people towards the PSOT website or its Facebook page. On the few
occasions where Twitter was used to invite discussion (e.g. when an episode of
Beneﬁts Street was starting to air), in contrast to Parasite Street, PSOT actively
avoided using #beneﬁtsstreet. In ways that echo the use of the hashtag #sealﬁe by
Inuit communities, the PSOT campaign used its own hashtags as a means to make a
conscious effort to distance themselves from the predominant online discourse
around the television show. In a further means to instil control, PSOT used YouTube
and Instagram primarily as ways to broadcast media related to the campaign; this was
particularly explicit with their YouTube account which had comments disabled and
was used as a way of enabling video content to be embedded on the main PSOT
website or to be shared via the PSOT Facebook and Twitter accounts. Such usage of
the video-sharing platform is now common by organizations - and referred to byKim
(2012) as the institutionalization of YouTube. Also, as noted, Facebook was the
primary platform with which the campaign conversed with its audience; this ap-
peared to be a further deliberate attempt to maintain rigid control of the discourse.
While PSOT presented a locally authentic identity and conveyed a spirit of being
“bottom up” through the sharing of peoples’ own good news stories, discussion on
the Facebook page was carefully controlled by only allowing followers to respond to
posts made by a small group of people central to the campaign. As such, it purposely
disallowed the public from proposing their own topics of discussion within the
community page; this presented a context where it was seen to be fair to remove
any comments and posts that might be considered to be deviating from any central
and consistent message. Mascaro et al. (2012) studied this process of agenda setting
by administrators of the Facebook page for the Coffee Party, an activist-initiated US
political movement. Control over the social media discourse was implemented by
allowing only administrators to initiate posts; although general group members were
able to comment on these posts and engage in polyvocal discourse, the ability for
moderators to set the tone of the discussion for each post, curate the entire page, and
carefully erase comments that challenge the discourse of the political movement,
facilitated strict top-down control and ownership of the Facebook discourse. This
was echoed, although at a smaller and in a less politically explicit manner, by PSOT.
It should be noted, of course, that the practice of carefully curating Facebook
timelines so that they reﬂect a predetermined performance or message has been
previously studied extensively for individuals (e.g. see Zhao et al. 2013; Zhao and
Lindley 2014). Ammari and Schoenebeck (2016) recently discussed how Facebook
groups are used to include and exclude certain voices from discussions around
societal issues (in their case fatherhood and stay-at-home parenting) while Crivellaro
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et al. (2014) revealed that although Facebook seemingly provides a space for
polyvocality in activism it can also be carefully moderated and managed by a
privileged few, i.e. comments can be moderated out (or just simply proposed for
moderation) - a practice that Crivellaro et al. relates to Hauser’s notion of ‘gentle
violence’ (Hauser andMcClellan 2010). It should be noted that platforms themselves
play a key role in facilitating or restricting this process, with the use of “Terms of
Service” enforcement by Twitter and Facebook to suppress anti-government activ-
ism during the Arab Spring being studied in detail (Youmans and York 2012).
Both campaigns therefore raise further questions around their attempts to take and
maintain control and ownership of the online discussion; these include issues around
the practices of curating individual messages and aggregated timelines but also
around the power, governance and inclusivity of their campaigns.
6.3. Power and privilege
While both sets of activists conﬁgured their work as primarily bottom-up and
grassroots in-as-much as they were contesting dominant discourses being commu-
nicated in a top-down manner by media organisations and other powerful entities,
both of themain protagonists had access to networks of power not normally available
to grassroots movements.
For example, Parasite Street utilised amailing list to access a loosely connected set
of activists and organisations considered authoritative and credible when publicising
the campaign. Previously, Juris (2005) in their analysis of anti-globalization activist
networks also describe how the “creation of broad umbrella spaces, where diverse
organisations and collectives converge around common hallmarks while preserving
their autonomy” allows activists to loosely organise and cooperate. SR’s involve-
ment in the hacktivist collective Undergr0und, along with his reliance on the activist
network NEON and the UK Uncut social media account, are clear examples of such
loose activist networks. UK Uncut deﬁnes itself as a “grassroots movement
taking action to highlight alternatives to austerity” (UK Uncut 2016), and is
aimed at countering the UK government’s austerity programme. Parasite
Street, on the other hand, is aimed at the abuses of the super-rich and the
problematic depiction of beneﬁts claimants on TV. Since these political aims
are ideologically related, SR was able to publicise Parasite Street on UK
Uncut’s Twitter feed due to its operation as an “umbrella space” for members of the
activist network. However, this is a privileged, closed space that is unavailable to
many. Later in the campaign, Parasite Street even utilised traditional broadcast news
media i.e. extremely powerful modes of communication unavailable to the majority.
Though PSOT, in contrast, localised their audience, they also had privileged access
to platforms, networks and services, such as placing advertising on local government
refuse vehicles and in print. The former is a completely closed space, exclusively
reserved for use by local government, and the latter is generally ﬁnancial costly to
utilise and publicize.
Counter-Discourse Activism on Social Media
This privilege serves to muddy the deﬁnition of both campaigns as grassroots and
activist in nature. Similar muddied terrain, in which a seemingly bottom-up cam-
paign has obfuscated beneﬁcial links to ofﬁcial power structures, has been explored
by marketing scholars such as Beder (1998) via the term “astroturﬁng”: a grassroots
movement created or supported by a company or organisation who may utilise
“specially tailored mailing lists, ﬁeld ofﬁcers, telephone banks and the latest in
information technology” in order to create a grassroots movement without any
legitimation from the public. The term is heavily loaded as scholars often use it to
denote subversive, malicious actions by corporations; for example, Beder describes
how electricity companies attempt to inﬂuence legislation through the use of
astroturfed advocacy groups. Similarly, Mix and Waldo (2015) raise awareness of
the ethical implications of NGOs and corporations using astroturﬁng to inﬂuence
democracy. Marketing researchers have also studied how brands on social media are
promoted by seemingly “activist inﬂuencers” (Booth and Matic 2011) who are often
covertly puppets of commercial organisations. For instance, organisations may
identify social media users who may have large reach (such as someone with
thousands of Instagram followers) and who are tangentially related to a product,
before contacting them directly to advocate, covertly, for a brand. As such, in many
respects the selection of activists by local government councillors in Stockton-on-
Tees might be considered somewhat analogous to these examples in that MM was
targeted to inﬂuence the discourse around Beneﬁts Street series 2, and was seen as a
local “celebrity” with inﬂuence. However, whilst the exact motivations of the
councillors are unknown, it can be imagined they are poles apart from the motiva-
tions that drive more typical commercial users of activist inﬂuencers or astroturﬁng
techniques. Nor should we conclude that MMwas unaware of any aspect of his own
role in the campaign.
An alternate view of MM’s involvement in PSOT, and even the use of well-
connected activists and celebrities by SR in Parasite Street, is that it was a deliberate
and intentional leveraging of followers or fans for a political cause. Bennett (2014),
for instance, describes how Lady Gaga motivates her fans through social media to
take part in her chosen activist causes. However, such use of privileged digital media
spaces (e.g. through mobilisation of hundreds of thousands of Twitter followers)
further blurs the boundary between activism and “digilantism” (digital vigilantism).
Numerous examples exist of the leveraging of Twitter followers in order to spread
views or incite action (see Associated Press 2016), and research studying the Reddit
investigation of the BostonMarathon Bombings notes the potential for digilantism to
provide positive civil investigation; however, the literature also warns of the suscep-
tibility of the process to give way to speculation, leading to potentially devastating
societal effects (Nhan et al. 2015).
Finally, though Nielsen (2013) observes when discussing #Occupy that the
majority of online activism still uses ‘mundane internet tools’, he also reminds us
that the use of such tools also limits participation and risks exclusion in itself. The
PSOT campaign can be seen to be attempting to address this issue of exclusion by
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taking a multiplatform approach to propagate the campaign message. On the one
hand, the campaign actively uses “mundane internet tools”, such as Facebook,
Twitter and Instagram, in order to interact with a population who have ready access
to social networking and prerequisite technology. It further leverages this techno-
privileged audience by asking for them to contribute content using their own media
(“Submit your photos, videos, etc.”). In contrast, the campaign also conducts work in
physical spaces through events such as the Loudest Whisper, and locally-oriented
advertising. However, in both cases outputs and further information of the events and
about the campaign in general are situated on websites. Parasite Street emphasises
this problem even further, as the primary focus towards just online social media
platforms excludes those who do not regularly use these, do not engage in live
tweeting practices, or do not have ready access to the required technology. Whether
this somewhat exclusionary focus has a detrimental effect on either campaign is not
clear, but the power afforded to each activist through the selection and placement of
content in digital spaces has considerable inﬂuence over participation, and subse-
quent interaction with the campaign. While research on digital civic engagement and
action has begun to pave the way for less-privileged digital forms of engagement (see
Vlachokyriakos et al. 2014), the warnings of Nielsen (ibid) remain prescient not only
for activists when designing campaigns, but for academics as a venue for further
study.
7. Conclusion
This research set out to explore the way that activists deployed and orchestrated
activist campaigns focused on presenting a counter-discourse to an established,
dominant discourse. Speciﬁcally, we analysed two campaigns surrounding the UK
TV programme Beneﬁts Street - a so-called poverty porn series that attracted
widespread engagement by TV viewers, yet was criticised for stigmatising and
othering people claiming welfare beneﬁts. We used critical discourse analysis as a
method to unpack the complex relationship between activists, technology and the
public. Our work builds on a relatively small body of research focused on under-
standing the creation and deployment of counter-discourse campaigns by activists
and our ﬁndings reveal that activists utilise an understanding of social media
platforms and tailor their campaigns towards speciﬁc target audiences. Furthermore,
while they utilise quantitative social media metrics such as shares and likes to
measure success, they hold anecdotal feedback with equal regard, such as receiving
mentions by traditional media and politicians. Our work has also revealed the
leveraging of technological affordances of different social media platforms by
activists as a means to control, contest or even own a discursive space. This is done
through exercising different strategies in order to direct discussion to a particular
space or use tools in a way so as to directly contest an existing discourse, such as
guiding users to a moderatable space (as in PSOT) or taking advantage of an
unmoderated platform to inject a counter-discourse (as with Parasite Street). We
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have explored some of the complexities of power and privilege that inﬂuence the
creation, propagation and engagement of counter-discourse campaigns. Utilising
different power modes of communication, either through the Twitter account
of a celebrity, as with Parasite Street, or the side of a local government
refuse vehicle with PSOT, campaign messages were placed in spaces that
could only be accessed through an existing privilege. This, therefore, also
raises tensions around the ambiguity of those grassroots legitimacy of activist
campaigns that have access to power.
Our analysis has identiﬁed several areas that provide opportunities for further
exploration by researchers in social computing, human-computer interaction and
computer-supported cooperative work. The means for understanding and measuring
the success of digital campaigns, online movements and activist campaigns are only
just beginning to be explored (Potts et al. 2014). It is clear from our own
work that activists use a mixed-methods approach when trying to understand
the success of their campaigns, and subjectively appraise anecdotal feedback
to measure its impact on the campaign. As such there are opportunities for
researchers to understand more fully the spectrum of methods used by
activists to measure their success. Further research is also needed into the
utilisation of the technological affordances of different social media platforms
in order to control a discourse. By examining the power inherent in the
technical affordances of platforms we were able to elucidate the way they
can be controlled, despite the majority of social media presenting itself as
open and participatory platforms for discussion. The leveraging of these
affordances by myriad groups, such as activists as studied here, through to
far-right political groups, is currently poorly understood. Due to the complex
and far-reaching effects that this kind of discursive control has on society,
further research in this area is certainly needed. There are also opportunities
for further research around the use of privileged access to digital media
spaces by powerful social actors, such as celebrities and activists, in order to
propagate and encourage engagement with a campaign or cause. The fuzz-
iness caused by a variety of complex power relationships, between activism,
digilantism and grassroots activism raises questions about motivations and
political positioning of activist campaigns. This creates questions around
grassroots activism and “top-down” powerful messages, the implications of
which are still open for discussion.
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